INTRODUCTION
In the financial crisis many countries are taking policy measures aimed at lowering the wage bill of the public sector, often by drastically lowering pay rates. The Netherlands has gone down that road before. During the deep recession of 1980-85 nominal public sector pay rates were onesidedly lowered by 3 per cent in 1984 and 'frozen' for most of the 1980s. That percentage may seem benign with hindsight, but at that time it was unique and high inflation affected purchasing power more strongly. It meant a one-time lowering of actual individual earnings and a permanent lowering of wage scales, but individual pay kept moving up because of tenure and did not necessarily remain frozen. In the end, the one-sided nature of the system of public sector wage negotiations was done away with -after unions had appealed to the ILO -while at the same time 12 decentralized wage agreements were instituted across the public sector in 1993 (Osmani 2011: 8) .
In the current crisis, public sector pay has been treated differently, and so far no pay cuts have been enforced though there have been suggestions and proposals for a freeze. That may be a matter of time -this took four years from the start of the recession in the 1980s. Currently, wage negotiations are long-drawn-out without reaching a conclusion, or their conclusion has been moderate or unsuccessful. Thus in practice there has already been a freeze of wage rates.
In various countries the (un)fairness of public sector pay relative to the private sector is used as an argument in support of cuts. In the Dutch policy debate of the 1980s the stress was on competitiveness more than on fairness. The pay cut was deemed to reduce gross (labour) costs in the private sector by enabling lower taxes. This resulted from a political debate about the size and growth of the public sector relative to GDP that had sprung from the recessions of the early and mid-1970s. The wage measure also fitted the customary first Dutch response to economic problems: wage Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access moderation. That obsession certainly seems less pronounced this time and arguments of public-private (un)fairness are heard much less than elsewhere. Even for occupational pensions -which are entirely based on capital funding -the debate is addressing the economy as a whole without any specific focus on public sector pensions. This chapter considers the current situation, compares this to the previous experience of public sector adjustment, and scrutinizes the latter's long-run effects. The rest of this section defines the public sector, while Section 2 discusses its economic importance and adjustments. Section 3 develops a longer-run view on employment and pay in the public sector in comparison with the private sector, and lays the main foundation for the argument that there is now little scope for downward public sector pay adjustment. The section consecutively deals with employment (level and structure), wage negotiations, average earnings (level and structure), and public-private wage differentials for individuals controlling for the differences in personal and job characteristics between the two sectors. Section 4 studies the developments since the start of the financial crisis in 2008 and discusses current and future policymaking concerning adjustments in the public sector, which are increasingly trending towards austerity. Section 5 presents two case studies, one concentrating on the long-run effects of the pay policies of the 1980s, illustrated by the educational system, and the other focusing on wage formation in health care. Section 6 concludes.
Defining the Public Sector
A precise definition is not trivial. Over time the boundaries of the public sector have shifted -as the privatization of Post and Telecom may illustrate -and there are also large international differences in drawing the boundaries. The definition can be formal, based on the legal status of the public servant, or substantive, based on the sector's role in the economy. Starting from the former would miss the point. Legal status has become less important even in its traditional territory, and the public sector has expanded into fields where that status is of little importance. Instead, we choose the economic argument as a point of departure and define the public sector as including the government -central and local, with armed forces and social security services -the educational system, and health care 1 and social services. Not included in the public sector but in the private sector are public utilities and publicly owned enterprises (for example, railways). These have a tradition of catering to private demand and operating without subsidies and are at arm's length from the government, especially with regard to their personnel policies as they have their own collective labour agreements. The educational sector, by contrast, depends fully on Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access public funding though the educational organizations are mostly private. Until the decentralization of wage negotiations of 1993 all wages were negotiated between the Ministry of Education and the unions. Since then this has increasingly been done between unions and employer associations founded by the individual institutions. Nowadays, the institutions range from organizations running (a number of) primary or secondary schools, to individual polytechnics and universities and associations for secondary vocational schools, polytechnics and universities. Responsibilities have been transferred increasingly from the ministry to the institutions, under the control of inspectorates. By contrast, health care has historically been fully privately organized and most of the higher-level medical profession is still self-employed in spite of the fact that since the introduction of the new obligatory health insurance system (ZVW) in 2006, health care has been almost fully publicly financed -or at least statistically classified as such because the ZVW financing is classified as a type of social security scheme. This classification may be overdone but it is also clear that health-care organizations are non-profit and do not operate as private sector firms. 2 Contrary to education the self-employed (doctors) have a crucial position in health care, but the focus of this chapter is employees. Their wages are privately negotiated between employers and unions in health care, though, as we shall see below, largely under the influence of the wage negotiations for government and education. The inclusion of education or health in the public sector affects its level and evolution very significantly and therefore a distinction is made between the three sectors throughout the chapter when possible and relevant.
THE ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
We start with the aggregate picture of the importance of the public sector in the national economy since 1970 (Figure 10 .1). This long-run perspective covers the prelude to the serious recession of the 1980s to enable a better evaluation of its effects. The size of public sector spending reached a maximum in the early 1980s with a total of 60 per cent of GDP -up from 44 per cent in 1970 for structural and cyclical reasons. Then a slow decline set in which was amplified in the 1990s and was back at the initial level of 1970 by the year 2000. There it has largely remained until the financial crisis pushed it again to over 50 per cent. Public sector gross income from taxation and other sources also grew and fell though somewhat less than expenditures. Virtually all years have had a budget deficit 3 but this was clearly bigger when the sector was larger in the 1980s, and again recently with the Figure 10 .2) indicates the importance of transfers to households. These include financial transfers and services provided in-kind. Transfers are responsible for most of the growth in total public sector spending of the 1970s, its high level in the 1980s, the subsequent decline, and the recent increase. This volatility contrasts with the stability (around 17 per cent) of current direct public spending. This includes public sector wages, which secularly declined from 14 per cent of GDP in the 1970s to 9 per cent in the mid-2000s, followed by a 2 percentage point increase during the financial crisis. The gap that opened up between total direct spending and the wage bill (4 to 8 per cent) may partly reflect the effect of outsourcing. Ever since 1980 public investments have been less than 4 per cent of GDP. Unsurprisingly, given the evolution of debt, interest payments reached a maximum in the early 1990s of 6.2 per cent of GDP. In recent years those payments have remained low at 10.1 Public sector spending, income, deficits and debt, Netherlands, 1970-2010 (% of GDP) Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access around 2 per cent of GDP, perhaps because part of the new debt relates to guarantees instead of actual spending. In the breakdown of transfers by social security, education and health care ( Figure 10. 3), the last two have climbed from 37 per cent of total transfers in the 1980s to 55 per cent currently. Health-care spending more than tripled to over 10 per cent of GDP and more than one-third of all transfers. Spending on education tended to decline in spite of the strong increase in educational participation. Social security spending is more volatile. It has borne the brunt of declining public spending since the 1980s. Between 1999 and 2008 it fell beneath its initial level of the 1970s (11 to 12 per cent). During the financial crisis, however, all three categories have contributed to the rise in spending, including education though that rose less. More than before health spending now seems to be part of the automatic stabilizers of the economy: from 2008 to 2010 spending rose by 1.5 per cent of GDP or 15 per cent of the starting level.
In-kind transfers, shown separately, increased strongly from 3 to 11 per cent of GDP, or 17 to 42 per cent of total transfers. The in-kind provi- 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 Netherlands, 1970 Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access sion by means of public services implies that part of private household consumption runs to private markets via the public sector, for example, health care, while another part is directly produced by the public sector itself, for example, education. Such provisions differ significantly between countries, depending on the financing mechanism. Where most if not all is private, as in the United States, the services are considered part of private consumption. Where this is not the case or less, as in the Netherlands, these services should be taken into account when considering public and private consumption. They are paid from public funds but ultimately privately consumed. A good example is provided by the recent ZVW act for health-care insurance: households pay an insurance premium to private insurers as well as a contribution through the tax system. The latter is used, first, to even out risks between insurers, who are obliged to accept any risk for a uniform set of care provisions and may vary their premiums between narrowly prescribed boundaries only aimed at ruling out risk selection. Second, the tax contribution is used for the compensation of effects on low-income households resulting from the uniform premium. Thus the market that actually provides the service is private, but the financing comprises four financial flows of which three go through the public purse. National Accounts statistics classify this as a social security scheme and attribute it to the public sector. However, 
EMPLOYMENT AND PAY
This chapter addresses the core issue of public sector adjustment which concerns pay and employment in comparison to the private sector. Four steps consecutively discuss the level and structure of employment, of collectively negotiated pay, of actual earnings, and of earnings corrected for employee differences relative to the private sector.
Employment: Growth, Especially among Women
Between 1970 and 2010 the number of people working in the public sector grew from 1 to 2.3 million and their share in employment increased from 19 to 27 per cent (Table 10 .1). Average hours per employee fell by more than one-quarter, mostly before 1990. They are below the private sector average as they declined more strongly because females' role grew and their average hours fell somewhat more. The public sector share in hours worked grew from 18 to 24 per cent. However, public sector growth ran virtually parallel to the significant expansion of services in the private sector, except for the last few years. Over 2008-11 public sector employment grew by 156,000 heads while private sector heads fell by 206,000 (of which 116,000 were in services). Table 10 .1 depicts this development with a breakdown by gender and the three public subsectors. Female employment shows a substantial upward trend and their employment share within the public sector grew from 44 to 67 per cent. This is exactly the opposite of the private sector, where men make up two-thirds of all employed persons. Female growth is particularly important for the recent increase in public employment since 2008: 134,000 out of the additional 156,000 were women. The breakdown by subsector shows that the inclusion of health care doubles the size of the public sector -certainly a non-trivial effect. Interestingly, a decline Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access is found in the share of government (8 to 6 per cent) after an initial rise; at the same time the share of education has remained largely unchanged. Unsurprisingly, the evolution of employment reflects that of expenditures ( Figure 10 .2: government wage bill; Figure 10 .3: health and education transfers). The role of women is much larger than for men in health care, about equal in education, and smaller though quickly growing in government. Since 2008 all three subsectors have shown employment growth (education 11.5 per cent; government 13.1 per cent) but health care (111.0 per cent) contributed 134,000 to the additional 156,000. Table 10 .2 adds important current detail. In the public sector older workers, substantial part-time jobs, large organizations, and especially high-educated workers are considerably overrepresented compared to the private sector. Ethnic minorities -more often young and less educated -are strongly underrepresented. There are substantial differences in composition between the three public subsectors, not only between health care and the other two but equally between government and education. In Table 10 .1 Public sector employment by subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1970 subsector and gender, Netherlands, -2011 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1970 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1975 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1980 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1985 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1990 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 1995 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 2000 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 2005 subsector and gender, Netherlands, 2008 Youths and the low educated are overrepresented in health care compared to government and education but not compared to the private sector. NonWestern ethnicity is equally underrepresented across the three subsectors. Health-care employees are paid the statutory minimum wage slightly more often than in the private sector and roughly twice as often as in government or education. The minimum wage applies to all employees and is indexed by collectively negotiated wage rates (Salverda 2010 ). It has not been frozen or lowered during the financial crisis so far but has followed the statutory trend of wage rates. The incidence of low pay, which could be estimated only as 130 per cent of the minimum wage, 4 is twice as high in the private sector as in the public sector. Here health care lags the private sector but is at three times the level of government and education. The table also highlights a few labour conditions, leaving out the physical ones -some of which are actually rather important in health care -and compares the public subsectors with the overall economy. Work speed is slightly below average but the workload is clearly higher in education. In government people work much longer hours at the computer screen. Health care has an above-average incidence of accidents at work. Employees in the public sector seem to be more satisfied with their working conditions and the nature of their work, but the national average is already high at 77-79 per cent. 
Negotiated Pay: Towards Decentralization
When considering pay we need to distinguish between collectively negotiated rates, which stipulate the general framework, and individual earnings, which depend on a worker's position in the system of wage rates and his/her tenure profile, and on the individual's working time. Decisions about pay used to be taken unilaterally by the state, albeit after talks with the unions. The government endorsed the trend of private sector wage negotiations until the early 1980s. Years of freezes and protest 5 followed, and in 1988 it was finally agreed that mutual agreement in wage negotiations would replace unilateralism. In 1993 decentralized collective negotiations and labour agreements were established for eight public subsectors, such as central government, municipalities and education. This number expanded to 14 after a further split within the educational subsector. As a result, wage developments have diverged. For each agreement there is a separate representation of relevant public sector employers. On the workers' side there is a limited number of unions, mostly represented in all negotiations. Union density among public sector employees exceeds that in the private sector, as in many other countries. In 1970 almost two-thirds of civil servants were a union member (ICTWSS database), but that fell to 35 per cent in 1995 and 25 per cent in 2011 (CBS 2011). 6 Though the level is still higher in the public sector the decline seems to have been slightly faster. Private sector union density is now 18 per cent. Of the current 2.3 million public sector employees, one million are covered by these 14 'pure' public sector agreements. Most of the rest are in a category of labour agreements for 'subsidized sectors', which has been distinguished since the 1980s when the government for the first time explicitly targeted also those with its wage policy (see Case Study 2). These sectors were considered 'followers of the trend', meaning that they will take the development of the pure public sector agreements as their point of reference. Health care is the most important of those, with 1.1 million employees. 7 This strong effect is an important argument of principle to include the health-care subsector in this study of the public sector. Figure 10 .4 presents the resulting real wage rates. Before 1980 developments were mostly in parallel, although the purchasing power of public sector wages had already started to decline after 1978. The rates are on an hourly basis including annual benefits such as a thirteenth month and after deflation for consumer prices. Education together with government is indicated separately from health care as, unfortunately, we cannot combine these into a single statistic for the public sector. Immediately from 1980 a large gap opened up to the private sector which kept increasing until 1985. By then government and education rates had lagged 19 per cent behind prices and private sector rates, while for health care the gap was 11 per cent. The latter, clearly under the influence of government policy, confirms the argument for including health care in the public sector. Since 1985 the three have again largely moved in parallel to one another and the gap to the private sector has remained unchanged. In real terms these rates have moved up only very gradually (111 per cent on balance), with clear cyclical effects in the 1990s and 2000s. 8 Figure 10 .5 shows the annual changes in real wage rates for the private sector and the three public subsectors since 1990, when a distinction between education and government became available. Although the long-run trend is much the same, temporary deviations are likely when agreements are concluded for more than one year and renewal is needed at a time of downturn and postponed. Clearly, each downturn (1990s, 2000s and now) affects real wage rates negatively and more so for the public subsectors via free access significant real growth 9 but rates have started moving down in 2010 for the private sector and for education. They fell in 2011 for all four (sub) sectors, in particular for education (-2.4 per cent) and government (-2.0 per cent). For health care they increased up to 2010 and fell slightly in 2011 (-0.7 per cent). Behind this lies the non-renewal of important collective labour agreements. In government and education in 2011 only three new agreements were concluded (municipalities, provinces and polytechnics) while one older agreement (academic hospitals) stipulated a rise in 2011; the 10 remaining agreements had expired and were not renewed (BZK 2011, Tables 4.3-16) . By contrast, in health care most agreements have not expired and are being renegotiated (website of main union Abvakabo FNV). Thus, although there has been formal equivalence of the unions as a negotiating partner for public sector wage agreements since the end of the 1980s employers can still have the upper hand by refusing to strike a deal, which normally implies that the existing agreement stays in force and wages remain unchanged. Naturally, this is no different in the private sector in principle, although in practice it seems otherwise.
Earnings: Losing Ground with the Private Sector
Negotiated wages differ from actual earnings. In cross-section the latter depend on how workers are distributed over the range of wage rates, while over time their developments may also diverge because individuals move along tenure scales. The annual increase in wage rates is an index number on a fixed basis; average earnings have no such fixed basis and are sensitive to composition shifts in any direction: gender, age, education, occupational level, industry, employment contract, and tenure. For example, the average may actually move up during recessions if the least paid lose their job. Figure 10 .6 shows the developments of hourly earnings for the public (sub)sector(s) compared to the private sector. Hourly earnings as a concept corrects for differences in hours of work or in parts of the year worked and best indicates the differences in rewards. They are taken on an annual basis and include bonuses such as the thirteenth month, which has been gradually introduced in many public sector agreements over the 2000s. The purchasing power of national average pay rose by 84 per cent -mostly during the 1970s (156 per cent). Earnings in education lagged substantially behind and fell from 66 per cent above the private sector in 1970 to 20 per cent above in the mid-1980s. After an initial rise, government relative earnings also fell considerably from the mid-1970s until the late 1980s. Since then the levels in these two subsectors have been 20-25 per cent above the private sector average. By contrast, health-care earnings have been below the private sector after an initial fall in the 1970s. The public sector as a whole has been paid some 10 per cent above the private sector since the end of the 1980s. The recent recession years show little deviation from the long-run stability. Table 10 .3 depicts the structure of earnings following Table 10 .1. Unfortunately, information is not available for educational attainment, ethnicity, or occupational level. The position of older workers and fulltime workers (351) is very similar within the two sectors. Surprisingly, that also holds across organization size despite its very different importance in the two sectors. Also the gross, uncontrolled gender pay gap is of a comparable order of magnitude (22-24 per cent) . However, the relative situation of young workers, workers on flexible contracts, and part-time jobs is rather more uneven in the private sector. Health-care hourly earnings resemble the subsectors of government and education more for youth, small and part-time jobs, and flexible contracts. By contrast, health-care outcomes are closer to private sector levels for females and prime-age and older workers, and larger organizations. Differences between government and education concern men, older workers, small and part-time jobs, and flexible contracts -here education exceeds government. Government has an advantage in medium-sized organizations.
These data relate to gross earnings as received by the employee includ- 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 2002 ing tax and contributions paid by the employee. Employer contributions are not included though these are particularly important for pensions. However, public-private differences for employer contributions have been much mitigated between 1995 and 2011: the employer share in gross labour costs grew from 13 to 21 per cent in the private sector, and from 18 to 24 per cent in the public sector. 10 In addition, secondary labour conditions such as for childcare or parental or care leave may be more favourable in the public sector. At the same time there are special bonuses in the private sector.
Earnings Differentials: Lower Disparity but Pay Penalty in the Public Sector
It is impossible to infer from these average earnings whether the characteristics that have been mentioned so far actually carry a pay premium in the public sector or not, because workforce composition is obviously an important determinant of these averages, as, for example, a higher employment share of high educated will lead to a higher average wage. Instead we should consider earnings differentials after correcting for composition differences. The public sector is often said to have a more compressed earnings distribution and this is commonly attributed to a relatively better treatment of low-educated employees, whose average earnings we do not know, unfortunately. Also no recent statistical information is available for the distribution of hourly earnings, while annual earnings risk is grossly misleading because they incorporate the significant variation in working hours. However, micro data (which will be used below) indicate that the distribution is indeed narrower in the public sector. Figure 10 .7 shows public and private sector hourly earnings at the same percentiles of the within-sector distributions. 11 At the bottom end, the fifth percentile of the distribution, public sector hourly earnings are 79 per cent above the private sector. The gap shrinks rapidly when moving up the distribution: 55 per cent at the 10th percentile, 36 per cent at the 25th percentile, 18 at the 50th percentile, and 11-10 per cent at the 75th and 90th percentiles. Ultimately, at the 95th percentile (the bottom of the top 5 per cent) it is the other way around. Here private sector earnings exceed those in the public sector by 6 per cent. At the mean, public earnings are 10 per cent above private earnings, in agreement with what was said before. Evidently, the private sector has a much longer tail of low pay than the public sector, the former's 25th percentile wage (€13) being similar to the latter's 10th percentile. The ratio of 90th to 10th percentile, often used as an indicator of wage inequality, is 4.1 in the private sector compared to 2.6 in the public sector. Notably, these results are still uncontrolled for compositional differences between the sectors.
Research by Berkhout et al. (2006) for 2004 is the latest and most extensive study of earnings differentials between the two sectors. 12 Berkhout and Salverda (2012) have extended the approach to 2009 and also gone back in time to 1979 using a somewhat restricted model that can be applied to the entire period given data limitations. It controls for those differences and highlights the effects on earnings of individual characteristics of employees (for example, gender, age, education) and their jobs (for example, working hours, occupational level), in isolation from the effects of the other characteristics. 13 On the basis of these estimations, an Oaxaca decomposition between the two sectors identifies the contributions made by the compositional differences. The unexplained residual of the earnings equations that remains after deducting the compositional effect indicates the specific contribution of each sector, that is, the controlled differential or the pay penalty or advantage of the public compared to the private sector. Table 10 .4 mentions for the latest year first the gross observed difference between the two sectors, followed by the contribution of the diverging composition after the many characteristics have been accounted for. Third is the remaining effect which can be interpreted as the public-private difference in pay for the same personal and job characteristics. The public sector as a whole suffers a pay penalty (-4.2 per cent) compared to the private sector. All three public subsectors carry a significant pay penalty, ranging from -2.7 to -5.6 per cent. At a more detailed level, full-time workers are at a disadvantage in the public sector; part-time workers have a very sizeable raw premium which is entirely explained by compositional differences. The table confirms the common observation that women are doing relatively better in the public sector. Men suffer a pay penalty at all levels of educational attainment, while women do so with tertiary education only. There is a clear gradient of the premium/penalty by level of educational attainment. The best educated face a strong penalty in the public sector. The two panels of Figure 10 .8 illustrate the effects of gender and educational attainment, respectively, between the two sectors with the help of age-earnings profiles simulated for the average population in terms of all characteristics except age and the shown variables. Private sector men have a pay advantage over the public sector for most of the age range (Panel A), while public sector women have it for all ages. The average gender gap within the private sector (-16 per cent) appears to be twice as large as in the public sector (-8 per cent). As a result, the public pay premium largely rests on this difference; therefore the male penalty may reflect the situa- via free access tion better. For males only, Panel B shows the profiles for the least and the best educated. The former do slightly better in the public sector at first, up to the mid-30s, but then the situation is reversed, although the difference remains small. The best educated in the public sector do better only up to the mid-20s but then the best educated in the private sector continue to rise to almost the highest age and reach a substantial premium, while public sector men plateau at the age of 50. For the least educated, earnings start to decline from the age of 50 in both sectors. Finally, Table 10 .5 indicates the evolution of the public-private differential over the long term since 1979 (penalties in bold). It shows a clear decline and ultimately disappearance (-2 per cent) of the initial pay advantage (14 percent) of working in the public sector in general. This is a two-step process: a steep policy-wrought fall in the 1980s, when a 7 per cent premium shifted to a 6 per cent penalty, followed by some recovery until 1996 (a neutral 0 per cent premium) and ending with a more gradual decline to -2 per cent perhaps partly masked by the growing role of women. Among the three public subsectors, government shows the largest fall, from the initial highest premium (7 per cent) to the lowest (-9 per cent), and subsequently recovered to a slight premium in 1996. Education fell less, though still substantially (+6 to -5 per cent), but never really recovered. Health care, the third subsector, shares the decline of the 1980s and subsequent recovery and ends roughly on par with the private sector, with a slight pay penalty only. After the decline of the 1980s, male workers never recovered and have been facing an increasing penalty ever since. Over time, this has spread from the best to the least educated. Female workers regained a premium and ended somewhat above par. Also among them the best educated have suffered a penalty and premiums have declined at lower levels of education. The upshot of this is that at the aggregate level, public sector pay has already been structurally aligned with the private sector. This may have gone too far as working in the public sector now carries a non-trivial pay penalty, with a steep educational gradient, and any future adjustment, aimed at maintaining the attractiveness of public sector jobs in labour market competition, might actually have to consider pay increases for the better educated.
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS SINCE THE FIRST QUARTER OF 2008 AND AUSTERITY POLICY
This sections considers the recent evolution of the economy and the public sector in more (quarterly) detail, and then presents the policy debate concerning public sector employment and pay in a double perspective: the short run of the current situation and the long run of the sector's role in the economy -a split that characterizes the debate in many countries.
Recent Developments
Real GDP per capita of the working-age population reached its peak in the first quarter of 2008 and subsequently declined under the influence of the financial crisis. First, it fell continuously to a trough of minus 5.2 per cent in the second quarter of 2009, then it recovered gradually until the second quarter of 2011 to a level still 1.1 per cent below the peak. After that it lost again, down to 2.0 per cent below the peak in the first quarter of 2012, four years after the start. The cumulative loss over 16 quarters since the start is 9.8 per cent of the 'peak-year' GDP, measured as four times the first quarter of 2008. There is no sign of recovery in 2012, the latest CPB official forecast being for a year-on-year decline by 0.75 per cent. 
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Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access Figure 10 .9 compares the current recession (diagonally shaded bars) with four preceding downturns, indicating cumulative effects over equally long periods of 16 quarters from the start. 14 During the recessions of the 1970s, 1990s, and 2000s (all short-lived in terms of GDP) 16 quarters led well into the ensuing upturn and brought per capita GDP significantly above the preceding peak level. Clearly, in terms of GDP the current recession (-10 per cent) is the most serious together with that of the early 1980s (-12 per cent), which hit the Netherlands more strongly than many other countries. Four other important economic aggregates are also shown in the figure. Private investments have shrunk (-58 per cent) more seriously than in the 1980s (-49 per cent). The current 25 per cent decline in public sector investment is radically less than in the 1970s and 1980s when its fall exceeded 60 per cent; it differs strongly, however, from the steep growth of the 1990s and 2000s. Private household consumption's cumulative decline by 4 per cent is in the same negative direction as the 1980s but not nearly as drastic as it was then (-24 per cent); however, the decline seems to be gaining speed currently and, again, the decrease contrasts with growth in the 2000s (112 per cent). At the same time government consumption shows strong growth (121 per cent), which is more than on any previous occasion. This growth has undoubtedly helped to mitigate the effects of the recession (see Case Study 2 on health spending).
If expressed comparably as percentages of ('peak year') GDP their estimated cumulative contributions during the current crisis so far are strongly negative for private investments (-9 per cent), less for private consumption (-2 per cent) and public investments (-1 per cent), and considerably positive for public consumption (15 per cent). The latter has counteracted one-third of the current decline.
The decline in employee numbers has lagged GDP decline by one year and so far has fallen cumulatively by only 2.9 per cent per capita. Cumulative hours worked per capita provide a sharper picture, falling slowly from the very start by a total of 7.4 per cent. These aggregate employment effects seem relatively mild compared to the 10 per cent cumulative fall of GDP. Because the lower employment levels endure, they will gradually close in on the GDP loss and may not remain so benign much longer. 15 Importantly, disaggregate employment effects look very different: the private sector lost and the public sector gained (Table 10 .6). 16 After four years the private sector employment level was 3.5 per cent lower and public sector employment was 5.7 per cent higher (see Panel A). Cumulatively, the private sector lost 10 per cent of jobs and 16 per cent of hours worked and the public sector gained 16 per cent in numbers and 18 per cent in hours (Panel B). 17 Unsurprisingly, the sectors' shares in total employment have moved in opposite directions by around two percentage points (Panel C).
All three public subsectors show some job growth but the main contribution is from health care with a cumulative increase of 22 per cent in heads and 27 per cent in hours. It is responsible for most of the shift in the public sector employment share (85 per cent for heads, more than 70 per cent for hours). However, growth has stopped for education and Notes: a. Persons may have more than one job, therefore the effect on jobs differs from that on persons in work; for the latter, no seasonally corrected information is available. b. Persons not seasonally corrected (but unnecessary as same quarters are compared). c. Incidence of fixed-term work may be overestimated in private sector and underestimated in public sector as all temp agency work is allocated to the private sector; differences to the 3-year evolution may be limited.
Source: CBS, Labour Accounts.
Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access government in 2010, followed by a 0.5 and 3.5 per cent decline in hours, respectively, up to early 2012. A split by gender in Panel A suggests that total female employment grew only because of a substantial increase in the public sector (8.7 per cent). Male employment grew in health care but declined in government and education. Panel D shows the evolution of permanent and temporary contracts. For lack of more recent and quarterly data the annual level of 2010 is compared to that of 2008. The two sectors clearly diverge. In the private sector permanent and temporary contracts suffer a decline of almost equal size. By contrast, both types increase in the public sector but temporary contracts do much faster. Temporary-contract growth is strongly (80 per cent) concentrated in health care, and extends a pre-existing trend that pushed temporary numbers up by more than 50 per cent between 2006 and 2008.
Finally, Panel E sheds light on the development of hourly earnings. In the private sector they have increased nominally albeit only very slightly (10.4 per cent), while they have declined in the public sector (-1.2 per cent), particularly in the government subsector. Note that this concerns averages that are sensitive to composition changes, which gather importance over the four-year period. In particular, a shrinking share of young people in employment may invoke a rise in the average; while they play a larger role in the private sector the upward effect of their disappearance from employment may be stronger there. The increasing role of women may have a mitigating effect but it is difficult to fathom the relevance for the sectoral comparison: the possibly larger individual effects in the private sector ( Figure 10 .8 upper panel) may be counteracted by the smaller share of women in the sector's employment. Real earnings -deflated by CPI -have increased in the private sector and decreased in the public sector except in education.
Policy Debate: Wage Cuts Not Considered a Viable Option
In adjusting the public sector workforce and wage bill, three issues are at play: the level and evolution of pay, the nature of the employment contract and the number of jobs in conjunction with the organization of the public services and their productivity. Naturally, there are other important options for policymaking concerning the public budget and public services which are not focused on the wage bill but on other public spending, such as subsidies and social security, or public revenues, such as from taxation. It is beyond this contribution to discuss those.
So far the policy debate has been less obsessed with pay, real wage moderation -for the public sector as much as the private sector -than usual, moderation commonly being the first response when confronted with an economic downturn. The change is difficult to explain though one may speculate that, first, the startling origin of the crisis in the operations at the heart of the globalized capitalist economy, the international financial sector, instead of in wage growth resulting from strong labour demand, together with, second, the preceding structural lowering of the wage share and the concomitant increase in the profit share, as well as, third, the novel environment of a monetary union, 18 may have something to do with it. In any case, the depth and duration of the crisis have taken policymakers by surprise both at the start in 2008-09 and again with the second dip in 2011-12.
This abstention from explicit wage moderation holds in general but also in particular with respect to the public sector. Nevertheless, the government has tried to freeze wage rates. It can be relatively easily accomplished (simply refusing to enter wage negotiations) and has a quick short-term effect -at least in comparison to projected wage increases. The government's forecaster CPB has opposed special short-run wage moderation for fear of deflation in a situation of mass (worldwide) overcapacity and the negative effects that deflation will have on debt (CPB 2009: 21; TV interview CPB director Teulings of 17 March 2009). The CPB expected the labour market to bring wage developments in line with the productivity effects of the crisis in the medium term. Also, in early 2009 a civil servants' task force, which was free to assemble any proposals for possible government budget cuts, did not suggest a lowering of salaries. Finally, those responsible for personnel management in the public sector fear what they have called the 'big exit'. The ageing of the public workforce -in 2008 35 per cent were aged 50 and over -and the negative effects of unattractive labour conditions (wage level and nature of the work) on younger employees and labour supply motivated the expectation that 70 per cent of all employees in government and education (30 per cent retirement, 40 per cent job mobility) will leave and need replacement by the year 2020. As labour conditions are already seen as lagging the private sector -particularly for the high educated -a specific lowering of public sector pay is not a helpful perspective (BZK 2011: 23) . In other words, public sector wages are no longer considered as needing downward adjustment. One may surmise that the alignment already brought about between public and private sector rules out the option of making special cuts in public sector pay.
Obviously, if pay is no longer an important option this constrains austerity measures in one direction and puts the limelight of public sector adjustment on the level and composition of employment. At the parliamentary elections of June 2010 eight out of nine political parties proposed in their programmes for the 2011-15 period a reduction in the number of people employed by the public sector, varying from 18,000 to 48,000 on top of an already projected decrease (-40,000) in government and education (CPB et al., 2010, Table 2 .3). Fewer parties proposed such a decline also for health care, between -15,000 and -50,000, aimed at reducing a projected increase (1150,000) and thus still leaving a net increase. The government established on the basis of these elections decided in its coalition programme to cut employment in government by 61,000 up to 2015. 19 A decrease (1-3 per cent) has already started to materialize in 2011 in government and also in education, which was thought to be exempted. The more benign treatment of health care may point to another potential constraint on austerity. ZVW-based health care covers the entire population and cuts may therefore provoke strong opposition. After the fall of the government in early April 2012 a temporary parliamentary coalition agreed on increased budget cuts aimed at lowering the budget deficit to 3 per cent of GDP in 2013, in line with European rules. However, the new coalition has done away with various cuts that had been decided by the previous coalition but will now no longer be pursued (Netherlands Government 2012) . In addition it is only a voting coalition and no new government has been established -instead, the September 2012 elections had clear results in terms of voting, but no government and no agreed programme as yet. The temporary coalition's plan regarding health care comprises implicit, unequal tax rises, such as augmented own risk and own direct financial contributions to certain treatments, which are generating strong public debate. Consequently, the current situation lends significant uncertainty to the exact nature of the cuts that will be made in the end.
A serious reduction in the size of public sector employment requires that either certain tasks be reduced or productivity increased. For realizing the latter, the simplest idea is to assume an annual productivity increase and adopt that in the budgeting. 20 A deeper option concerns adapting the organizational set-up of the public sector. The Netherlands seems to be at the forefront of policy analysis here. At the country's request, the OECD has undertaken the study 'Public Administration after "New Public Management" ' (2010) . Although the size of Dutch public sector employment is modest in international comparison, a relatively large share of it seems to be devoted to administrative tasks instead of policymaking: 83 per cent at central government and 47 per cent at local government (BZK 2011, 10ff) . This comprises, for example, the Tax and Customs Administration, Prisons, and the Public Employment and Unemployment Benefit administration UWV. The three taken together make up 42 per cent of central government employment. One option ventilated in the policy debate is to entirely close down UWV. Naturally, the tasks will not disappear, but these would be deemed to go to local government. In recent decades many tasks have already shifted to that level while budgets were reduced at the same time. It remains to be seen where this debate will lead and how the quality of the services can still be guaranteed.
In the meantime, the lack of general policy measures regarding pay together with the decentralized nature of public sector wage negotiations in combination with the focus on specific measures targeting public sector employment, may explain the absence of general strikes and worker manifestations. Instead focused manifestations have taken place, the most important of which have been in education: a strike in secondary schools against a proposed change in teachers' working hours and holiday entitlements (26 January 2012, 21 ,000 teachers), and a national manifestation protesting against a €300 million cut in the special teaching to specialneeds pupils in secondary education (6 March 2012, 50,000 teachers), An ongoing series of actions protesting against the proposed €1 billion budget cut of WSWs, which provide 100,000 jobs for vulnerable groups, through a reduction by 70,000 places and a shifting of the remaining 30,000 places from the responsibility of central government to that of municipalities. In WSWs people are employees and represented by trade unions. This is part of a more general change in labour market provisions which is aimed at moving people with partial capacities out of assistance and WSWs towards the labour market for obtaining an income. According to the protests, it is fully unrealistic to expect the labour market to cater for these vulnerable groups, who as a result will lose much of their income.
Finally, when going the way of such employment reductions, short-run savings for the public budget are substantially reduced by the obligation for public sector employers to pay unemployment benefits to the persons involved in involuntary layoffs. The previous government intended to change the contractual conditions of employees in government and education, aiming to reduce such entitlements and also increase the possible savings in the short run (Regeerakkoord VVD-CDA 2010 financial appendix, 5) . However, such changes have been on the agenda for decades.
The end result seems to be that the decentralization of wage bargaining within the public sector, together with the decentralization of governance responsibilities for public services (for example, to individual schools) and social provisions (to municipalities) makes it much harder to oppose budget cuts and to do so in a way perceptible at the national level where political sensitivities may be greatest. At the same time, it may be legally more difficult to endorse such cuts.
TWO CASE STUDIES OF PAY CUTS
During the major recession of 1980-85 important changes were made to the wage structure in education and to wage negotiations in health care. These provide interesting illustrations of how the public sector has come Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access to adjust (wage) costs in these two important subsectors and of the effects of such a process. For education we focus on the long-run effects of wage changes, while for health care we also address government interference in private-party prerogatives. It seems important to see what lessons can be drawn from 30 years of experience of public sector adjustments.
Case Study 1: Long-run Effects of Wage Adjustment in Education 21

The reforms
Before the bargaining decentralization of 1993 negotiations in education were held between the Ministry of Education and the unions within the framework of a single structure covering all personnel in primary and secondary education and in polytechnics (part of tertiary education). 22 In 1982, in the midst of the recession, the government launched a plan for structural reform of the structure (HOS) aimed at moving away from a strong grading according to parts of the educational system and educational qualifications of the teacher. A function-based structure was proposed where job requirements would determine pay, also no longer in conjunction with age but with experience and tenure on the job. This would strengthen equal pay for equal work, bring the educational wage structure in line with that of the civil service, lower average labour costs, and make the future educational budget more predictable as additional qualifications obtained by the teachers would no longer influence pay. After two years of negotiations, the major unions agreed to a change that would be budgetary neutral at the time of introduction -allowing compensating measures for incumbent teachers -but generate structural budget savings in the future. In 1985 the basics of HOS were implemented. As the new system would be less strongly graded by qualifications, many incumbent teachers would receive a pay increase -particularly in primary education, junior secondary education, and vocational senior secondary education. For other incumbents, measures were taken to protect their wage-career prospects, up to a point. However, the position of the first-graded teachers (with an academic degree) was diminished, especially through the introduction of lower scales, presented as a lengthening of the tenure path by means of a downward extension. 23 The original first-grade pay scale would now relate to a specified senior function and could no longer be reached automatically. In addition, budget neutrality applied to the situation that teachers' pay had already undergone a special reduction targeting all teaching salaries (WIISO) by 1.85 per cent as of 1 January 1983. This was meant as an austerity measure reaping the benefits of proposed structural salary changes 24 and a general lowering by a nominal 3 per cent of all public sector pay as of 1 January 1984. Public spending on education declined relatively rapidly from 6.7 per cent of GDP in 1982 to 5.7 per cent in 1985.
Increased inequality and strikes
Although the new system abolished unequal pay for equal work as a result of individual qualifications, it established a new inequality between incumbent teachers and the 'post-HOS' new entrants, who experienced this as particularly unfair because the pay gap could be wide (25-30 per cent) . The significant increase in new entrants' numbers led to many protests, initiated outside the unions which, after all, were partners to the agreement. Protests succeeded in putting the issue on the political agenda and various reparations were made (for example, higher starting salaries in 1992 with some compensation over 1985-92, shorter tenure scales in 2002). However, not all problems were solved, witness, first, that even 15 years later, in 2000, the national Equal Treatment Commission (CGB 2000) concluded that female re-entrants had been discriminated since the introduction of the new system in 1985, partly also because of the protection given to incumbents at the time of the HOS introduction. Second, even more recently, the ultimate repair -re-establishing the automatic tenure for first-graders up to the top scale, albeit conditionally -was agreed for the year 2014, closing the circle 30 years after the start.
Less attractive conditions and lower quality
The pay restructuring has made working in education less attractive, especially to the academically educated, and thus the average level of teacher qualifications has declined. This, together with the abolition of incentives of the old structure for individual human capital investments, is seen as contributing to a decline in the quality of educational output, among a host of other reforms that have taken place since the 1980s, such as, for example, the decentralization of budget spending to the schools 25 and the drastic changes made one-sidedly by government to the curriculum and the organizational set-up of secondary education.
The conclusion of this is that though at present in various countries many may prefer the long-run perspective of structural reform over that of short-run austerity, one has to be very careful as the nature of the structural change may actually be affected by the context of austerity. This may affect the workplace (equal treatment) but also the output (quality). In this case, a structural reform may soon run into difficulties while the remedy may take a long time.
Case Study 2: Government Interference in Private Wage Setting in
Health Care 26
A sector in competition with the private sector
Traditionally, the largest part of the health-care sector is financed from public funding, mainly social security funds, 27 but at the same time all health-care producers (hospitals, general practitioners and so on) are legally private parties. This implies a labour market exclusively populated by private employers and suppliers of labour, and operating in a way fully comparable with the private sector. Notably, wages are the largest category of spending in the subsector, comprising more than half of all gross production costs -a share more than twice as high as in the private sector. Clearly, this situation of direct public-private interaction can lead to a conflict of interests in times of economic recession, when a government would aim to restrain or cut public spending, including for social security and subsidies.
Wages: a target of government policy
Such a conflict arose during the recession of the early 1980s, and it particularly involved employees and their unions as wage formation in health care became a direct target of government policy making. In 1979 the government introduced a temporary ad hoc law (TWACS) obliging organizations receiving subsidies or social contributions to endorse in their wage bargaining the pay developments of central government civil servants, which were legally decided unilaterally by the governmentwith the strongly negative results shown in Figure 10 .4. First enacted to run until the end of 1980, the TWACS duration was extended four times 28 and it finally expired at the end of 1985, to be replaced by a new law (WAGGS) which was made permanent in 1988. As an ultimate remedy, this law allowed the government to undo the results of wage negotiations and impose a return to the previous situation. WAGGS made the criterion for selecting organizations subject to this regulation more general, 29 and though in principle the criterion was narrowed down from any financial contribution from government to an 'important' contribution, it also became clear that this meant important not only relative to the organization finances but also to the absolute amount of public funds involved.
Wage bargaining undermined
From the very start of the law-making process in 1979 (TWACS), the main trade union confederation FNV protested against this as a violation of free collective bargaining under two ILO Conventions, the Freedom Figure 10 .4. In 1990-91, the government made noises about dropping the ultimate remedy. It asked the SER for new advice which in 1992 proposed dropping the ultimate remedy and made a number of suggestions for a comprehensive way of dealing with the problem of conflicting public-private interests. In the meantime the applicability of WAGGS was gradually reduced quantitatively by concluding specific budgetary agreements with certain sectors. WAGGS was terminated in 1995 and replaced by a complex set of rules (OVA) on how the relevant budget available for wage bargaining will be determined by the government and communicated to the employers. The starting point of OVA would be the trend of private sector wage agreements corrected for wage drift and desired productivity growth. The latter was dropped during the first few years after various (legal) conflicts arose and finally, in 1999 a Covenant was concluded between the associations of healthcare organizations and the government which has remained in force until today, although in 2007 another legal case was needed to prevent a budget reduction.
As we have seen, wage rates have developed very much in parallel between government, education, health care and the private sector over the past two decades. However, the effect of abolishing TWACS and WAGGS may become visible in the current situation. Recently, healthcare wage rates have developed more favourably than for government and education, as OVA rules still allowed significant budgetary increases. 30 The upshot is that wage adjustments in the public sector cannot be made indiscriminately but have to account for diverging legal obligations. The final conclusion is that the views of the ILO do matter even if it takes a long time to take a government to task for violating ILO Conventionseven for cases which seem more nuanced than the common violations of trade union rights.
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CONCLUSIONS
The public sector is defined here as including health care (employees only), government and education. Under government pressure, health-care wage formation has run increasingly parallel to government and education since the recession of the early 1980s. It is an important argument for including health care in the public sector concept, despite the fact that it is entirely operated by private institutions. Health-care finance was traditionally not exclusively run through social security (ZFW and AWBZ) but has come fully under the sway of public sector finances since the new national health-care insurance system (ZVW) was introduced in 2006. Because of its sheer size including or excluding health care has a major effect on the comparison of the public and private sectors, as the specifications presented throughout the chapter can show. In recent decades, the public sector has grown significantly in size relative to the private sector, although structurally at the same pace as private sector services. However, virtually all of that relative increase has been in money benefits and in-kind public services provided to private households. Thus the public channel to individual consumption has become significantly more important. Potentially, this broadens the effects of austerity measures on the population and the opposition to them. Public sector employment has mirrored this development: the quantitative importance of public sector basics, that is government, has hardly changed since 1970; education has shown a slight increase at best; health-care employment, by contrast, has expanded enormously. Naturally, the composition of the public sector workforce is affected by the inclusion of health care. Women, older workers, part-time jobs, the highly educated, higher job levels, large organizations, and irregular hours are strongly overrepresented in the public sector, while, by contrast, young people, ethnic minorities, flexible employment contracts, small jobs, and minimum wage earners are overrepresented in the private sector.
Public sector wage bargaining generally follows the trend of the private sector, with the important exception of the 1980s when, in the wake of the severe recession, wage rates suffered a policy-wrought permanent decline by 20 per cent in government and education and 10 per cent in health care. Average (unadjusted) actual earnings in government and education have remained 19-22 per cent above those in the private sector, those of health care slightly below. However, after correction for the important public-private differences in employment composition, working in the public sector appears to carry a pay penalty. The public sector pay advantage that existed at the end of the 1970s has been more than taken away. The penalty is particularly significant for the highly educated and, Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access unsurprisingly, also for the educational subsector. The low educated are on a par with the private sector ( Figure 10 .8, lower panel). Fundamentally, pay has already been aligned between the two sectors and there is no longer an economic need for downward public sector pay adjustments. Key public sector personnel policymakers are keen to ensure that public sector jobs remain attractive to labour supply as they fear that 70 per cent of the public workforce will have to be replaced over the current decade because of ageing and job mobility. Nevertheless, negotiated wages have been falling in real terms recently, to varying degrees (government -1.3 per cent, education -2.7 per cent, health care -0.8 per cent), as a result of the non-renewal of important collective agreements in education and government and modest renewals in health care. Non-renewal amounts to a nominal wage freeze. However, to date the differences with the private sector (-1.2 per cent) have been small. These developments may explain why there has been little taste for lowering public sector pay in the current financial crisis. However, at the time of writing after the downfall of the coalition government, the parliamentary majority which rapidly agreed on a set of budget cuts has included a nominal two-year (2012-13) wage freeze in government and education, considering this an inescapable measure to satisfy the Eurozone's 3 per cent deficit rule. It remains to be seen, however, how this freeze can be squared with the formal termination of one-sided wage determination in 1988 and the decentralization of public sector wage bargaining to 14 separate agreements, which imply that nowadays the government is the employer of its own civil servants only.
The policy discussion has structurally focused on shrinking and reorganizing public sector employment, aimed at reducing the wage bill while simultaneously stimulating the effectiveness and productivity growth of public services and improving the attractiveness of public sector jobs to the labour supply. To enhance the budgetary savings from the implied redundancies, the government intends to reduce the entitlements of employees in government and education to a say in the process of reorganization as well as to unemployment benefit. However, reorganizing employment is a more complex and longer-drawn-out process of taking specific measures, especially as many responsibilities have been or are being decentralized to municipalities, individual institutions, and also to separate wagebargaining forums. This decentralization is a second type of public sector adjustment that has already been pursued extensively over the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, it lends a nitty-gritty character to the opposition mounted to such measures. As a result, the opposition can often no longer be consolidated at the national level, where the public debate and political sensitivities may be stronger than at decentralized levels.
In addition, the lessons of the previous deep recession in the Netherlands
Wiemer Salverda -9781781955352 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/22/2019 06:37:38PM via free access of 1980-85 seem to be that various measures that were considered to be structural may actually have been affected by their short-run context of austerity necessitating long-run repair efforts. Wage cuts made in education over 1980-85 are still being put right to this very day. The government's infringement of wage-bargaining rights in health care from 1979 onwards met its nemesis in 1995 as a result of appeals to the ILO conventions on freedom of association. As a consequence, wage bargaining in health care has become less susceptible to government pressure legally and current outcomes do indeed exceed those of government and education. Furthermore, the newly agreed wage freeze does not apply to health care. Finally, the general appetite for lowering wages is surprisingly weak, despite the strong effects of the crisis on the Dutch economy -with a renewed recession in the second half of 2011 -and the burden of public debt that was incurred by bailing out the country's relatively large financial sector. This reticence is based on past experience and motivated by the shrinking of demand more broadly, far beyond the Dutch economy, and fears of deflation which can aggravate the problems of debt.
